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WHEN RISKS MEET: THE DANCE OF EXPERIENCE, 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE AND SCIENCE IN BORDER 
SECURITY TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT* 
TERESA DEGENHARDT, Lecturer in Criminology 
MIKE BOURNE, Reader in International Security Studies 
 
Abstract  
As policing and threats become increasingly transnational and plural, practices of 
managing risk increasingly use technologies that promise certainty. Drawing on a study 
of the creation of a new border detection device, and ideas from Science and 
Technology Studies, we argue that devices deployed as objective tools for risk 
assessment and management in the policing of borders, and the laboratories that 
develop them, are not simply linear applications of scientific knowledge to control risk 
but rather are crucial sites in which multiple and contending conceptions and practices 
of risk converge. Following the interactions of scientists, border guards, policing agents 
and the EU shows how an  official discourse of risk, a scientific conception, and 
experiential working knowledge of risk all ‘danced’ together in the development of a 
portable detection device. In the process experiential/contextual and professional 
knowledge of risk were often privileged over rationalistic and statistically based risk 
assessment.	
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*	The authors are grateful to Robert Miller, Sarah Moore and the anonymous reviewers 
for comments on a previous draft, and to all those that kindly agreed to be interviewed 
and collaborated with the research process.  
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Introduction 
 
One of the cornerstones of the EU is the free movement of people and goods, but 
since 9/11, security and crime control have become a central concern. With increased 
concern about transnational terrorism, our inability to predict risk has become apparent, 
causing us to privilege the prediction of catastrophes in the governmentality of the 
future (Aradau and van Munster, 2009). According to Amoore ‘the imagination of “low 
probability, high consequence” events has become an overwhelming feature’ in how we 
understand risk (2013: 1; Beck 1992, 2013; Douglas, 1994; Giddens, 1991). Borders 
now play a crucial role in the regulation of risk (Aas, 2005; Bowling, 2013; Pickering 
and Weber, 2006; 2013; Wonders, 2007). The employment of technology, particularly 
algorithmic technologies, information systems, and biometrics, is now hailed as a 
‘magic bullet’, ‘an absolute security provider’ (Marx, 2005; Ceyhan, 2008: 102), an 
‘ultimate solution’ to ‘the unknown and risk generated by globalization and reinforced 
by September 11’ (Ceyhan, 2008: 103). In short, then, technology is supposed to make 
known and authorise decisions in the face of a radical ‘non-knowing’ (Walklate and 
Mythen, 2016: 408). Technology increases the capacity to surveil and control, 
combining crime control and containment with the possibility of pre-emption (Marx, 
2005; Wilson, 2006; Bowling, Marks and Murphy, 2008). In doing so, as Katja Franko 
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Aas claims, ‘contemporary technological paraphernalia...not only enables fortification 
of the border, it also reshapes the border according to its own logic.’ (2005: 208).  
This article explores how risk and security are engaged by those that create 
security technologies. It is based on a social science study of an EU-funded technology 
research project in which scientists and laboratories across Europe engaged with end-
user border guards to develop a handheld device to detect CBRNE (chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive)† smuggling at EU borders. The article 
contributes to the growing engagement with borders and risk across the fields of 
criminology and security studies (Aradau and Van Munster, 2009; Bigo, 2016; Mythen 
and Walklate, 2016; Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016). It expands knowledge of the 
governance of security (Wood and Shearing, 2007) by highlighting the role played by 
research groups and laboratories in shaping emerging modalities of transnational 
policing in the context of international terrorism. In doing so we show how  diverse 
actors’ engagement with different forms of risk, ways of knowing risk, and security 
narratives combined and redirected technology from catastrophic risks of CBRNE 
terrorism  towards wider materials and modes of policing at borders by detecting 
cocaine, tobacco, explosives and radiation.   
																																								 																				
† The literature, policy and practice in this area sometimes refer to CBRN (chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear) materials and terrorism, and at other times to CBRNE (adding conventional 
explosives). We use both terms, following the sources cited.  
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We draw on concepts from science and technology studies (STS) to engage the 
social and political dimensions of the processes of technology development within the 
laboratory as a crucial component in the determination of seemingly neutral and 
objective rationalities deployed by the technology. We argue that a device is more than 
just a technological tool and should be seen as an important component in the process of 
transnational policing (Bowling and Sheptycki, 2015) and in the deployment of specific 
rationalities in the governance of security. We ask, given the heterogeneous nature of 
the scientific process, how are supposedly apolitical, technical, ‘objective’ facts of risk 
formulated to create the rationale for a device alleviating risk? Engaging STS allows us 
to open the ‘black box’ of technology to scrutiny by exploring how the device is built. 
However STS rarely engages security technologies. In criminology, to our knowledge, 
no one has explored how specific logics and rationalities enter technological 
development with a consequent impact on security practices, in spite of some authors’ 
encouragement to do so (Valverde, 2011; Zedner,  2009). In criminology, technology 
has mostly been analysed in its later use – such as in practices of surveillance and 
border control and their social sorting effects and discriminatory practices enacted 
against those considered risky (Lyon, 2003; Wilson, 2006; Aas, 2005). In this sense, 
scholars have rightly pointed to the need for procedural and ethical rules to regulate 
technology, warning of possible violations of human rights (Bowling, Marks and 
Murphy, 2008). Here, we argue it is also important to open up technology and 
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laboratories to political scrutiny given the important roles they increasingly perform in 
the production of security at borders and in policing. In doing so, we uncover the 
specific narratives of risk and uncertainties engrained in the process and how they are 
framed, combined, and worked through.  
Overall, we argue that technologies and the laboratories and collaborations that 
produce them are crucial sites in which multiple and contending conceptions and 
practices of risk converge. We show how the certainty provided by a technological 
device is contingent on a combination of uncertainties, of heterogeneous interactions of 
humans and matter, and the multiple forms of risk and risk knowledge scientists engage, 
escape or supplement. We suggest that these sorts of engagement, to cite STS scholar 
Andrew Pickering (1995, 2017), are a ‘dance of agencies’.  
The article first situates our argument in the literature on policing, risk and 
security and the use of technology, and formulates our notion of the ‘dance of risks’. 
We then outline our methods, before turning to the analysis of our findings on how 
diverse risks and risk management practices are combined in practice. We argue 
technology development is not a neutral procedure: it is a complex process involving 
many sorts of exchanges between scientists, policing agents and border guards, and the 
EU, with a range of devices, dangerous materials, and forms of scientific knowledge. 
We show how an official discourse of risk, a working knowledge of risk, and a 
scientific conception all “danced” together as they combined to create a portable 
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detection device. In the process experiential/contextual and professional knowledge of 
risk were often privileged over rationalistic and statistically based risk assessment. We 
draw this out through explorations of how the decisions about what to detect emerged 
through particular combinations of catastrophic and mundane threats and logics; how 
the laboratories became attuned to the ways risks are engaged at the border; and the 
ways scientists engaged their own everyday uncertainties through technical savoir, gut 
feeling and imagination. We conclude by highlighting the transversal significance of 
experiential and professional knowledge across these dimensions.  
 
Policing risk and security at the EU border: staging sovereignty and control 
through technology 
In this article, we argue that security technologies are not merely neutral devices 
produced in isolated laboratories and then deployed at border sites (Bourne et-al, 2015), 
but important components that shape emerging modalities of transnational policing of 
borders. Such technologies are inherently political assemblages even before their 
deployment, and following their production allows us to trace multiple risks and 
uncertainties as they combine and emerge in the interactions of multiple actors, matter, 
and policing rationalities.  
It is now common to look at policing as broader than what the police do 
(Haggerty and Ericson, 2000; Wood and Shearing, 2007; Bowling and Sheptycki, 2015; 
forthcoming	in	Criminology	and	Criminal	Justice.	Draft	version	before	copy	editing.		
[Type	text]	 [Type	text]	 [Type	text] 
7	
Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016) and to understand issues of crime as related to other 
forms of external threats under the wider umbrella of security. We see technologies as 
more than simple policing tools, we view the process of technology development as an 
important process in the development of policing logics emergent in the interactions of 
scientists, end-user border guards, bordering practices, and material agencies. As such 
we see both technology and border policing as assemblages in which multiple forms of 
risk knowledge and practice are combined.  
Assemblages are heterogeneous, self-organising arrangements of different 
elements, comprising people and things, the unity of which - is only ever provisional, 
constituted by their contingent relations based on connections of these heterogeneous 
elements and that cannot be reduced to its components (Schuilenburg, 2015), ‘The 
assemblage’s only unity is that of co-functioning: It is a symbiosis, a “sympathy”’ 
(Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 69).  What is important, then, is that assemblages do not 
diminish differences so much as draw them together as they work together. Border 
policing, risk management, the project we studied, and the device it produced, are all 
assemblages in this sense.  
In their seminal work, Ericson and Haggerty (1997) highlight the need to look at 
policing as ‘risk communication’ and to consider how other institutions identify and 
manage risk. The logic engrained in specific systems of communication shape the 
ensuing modalities of policing, altering established structures of command and control 
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and both circumscribing and dispersing discretion (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). In this 
framework, we explore what kind of rationalities and practices of risk entered the 
development of a technological device to detect CBRNE. We show how risk logics 
were communicated and combined, thus highlighting some of the structures of control 
and forms of discretion engrained and dispersed within the seemingly neutral 
technological tool.  
Technology development is a complex process. The detection device we discuss 
here is aimed at the surveillance and detection of dangerous materials, including 
CBRNE. It manifests the ‘desire to control’ substances rather than individuals (Guzik, 
2016), relying on machines able to transform material traces into information and 
communicate the danger lurking in some substances to manage and ‘make visible the 
invisible’ threats (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). In following the creation of such a 
device, we wished to explore what specific forms and understanding of risks were 
engrained. We found that various forms of knowledge, practices, resources and 
mentalities from different ‘nodes’ (Wood and Shearing, 2007) are integrated and 
assembled (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000). The project was intended to develop and 
integrate technologies that are usually separate (sensors for different types of 
substances) into a portable unit to engage the mobility of threats. In doing so multiple 
laboratories with different scientific specialisms, national cultures and types (academic 
and commercial) came together with end-users. In the laboratories, the detection device 
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ended up incorporating and assembling diverse risk narratives enabling the detection of 
different security threats at the border. Rather than using notions of risk as probabilities, 
different narratives of risk were present, thus confirming previous research on risk.  
Risk determinations and narratives have changed the way the criminal justice 
system operates and is managed, eliding the role of professionals and experts (Feeley 
and Simon, 1992; Castel, 1991; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Garland, 2001). However, 
recent empirical studies have demonstrated how different logics co-exist and merge 
with statistical and rationalistic understandings of risk as they are operationalized within 
the criminal justice system (Werth, 2017; Mythen and Walklate, 2011; Kemshall 2010; 
Kemshall and Maguire, 2001; O’Malley 1992; 1999; 2004; Hannah-Moffat, 1999; 
2005; 2010; Hutchinson, 2006). Actuarial knowledge combines with, rather than 
eradicates, discretionary decision making, with ‘experience’, ‘gut feeling’, ‘experts and 
practitioners’ knowledge’ becoming important components in the determination of 
uncertainty, evidencing the presence of affective, experiential and moral judgements 
(Werth, 2017; Hannah-Moffat et-al, 2010). Experiential knowledge and ‘knowing 
otherwise’, rather than being seen as ‘wrong knowledge’, are used in extremely 
complex situations and in the context of great uncertainty, with multiple actors 
contributing to the final determination of risk (Baillegeau and Duyvendak, 2016; 
Walklate and Mythen, 2011). Our research confirms these findings in different 
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empirical settings, highlighting the role that experiential and practical knowledge has in 
the process of technology development. .  
We trace this multiplicity of forms of risk in the development of the device. We 
argue that technologies are not simple linear applications of scientific knowledge to 
policing problems. As STS literature shows, laboratories both produce reality and are 
themselves a product of a contingent and specific set of social relations (Latour and 
Woolgar, 1979). Laboratories incorporate ‘exchanges between specialists and the world 
that surround them’ (Callon et al, 2001: 47). We sought to follow these exchanges to 
reveal that the ‘scientific knowledge’ produced through the device is not just one form 
of risk knowledge among others, but is itself prefigured and constituted through 
multiple ways of knowing risk. In this case, the device is the contingent outcome of 
interactions between those with actuarial and experiential knowledge, between gut 
feeling and empiricism, between scientists and engineers, border officials, government 
institutions and others.  Indeed, the ways different modes of knowing risk are connected 
and translated into each other were central to drawing together the different professional 
cultures of scientists and border guards. In particular, situated knowledges of everyday 
experience emerged as central: sometimes overriding the value of catastrophic risk, and 
probabilistic determinations, sometimes ‘de-risking’ the uncertainties of technology 
development, sometimes allowing scientists to translate the advice of end-users into 
their own practices.  
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In exploring how different narratives of risk are assembled in the technical and 
supposedly objective tool, we borrow two metaphors from Andrew Pickering’s work in 
STS. For Pickering, technology development draws together multiple forms of agency: 
both human and non-human. The first metaphor is ‘tuning’ (as one might tune a radio, a 
car engine, or a piano). This resonates with the goals of the handheld border device. It 
was intended to detect the presence of risky substances by finding traces of radiation, 
cocaine, tobacco etc. The instrument being created must ‘tune in’ to the identifiable 
signatures, frequencies, etc. of the risky material. Pickering’s metaphor extends to 
include how scientists orient themselves to the action, the agency, of their target 
substance. In this process, uncertainty is high: ‘No one knows in advance the shape of 
future machines and what they will do’ (Pickering, 1995: 14).  An important component 
of technology development is the responses that different materials provide to the 
actions of scientists. How, then, do scientists ‘tune in’ to the agency of matter and enrol 
it into the actions of border guards in policing borders?  
In the second metaphor, Pickering says tuning occurs in all ‘goal-oriented 
processes’ of scientific practice as a ‘dance of agency’. In this dance metaphor, 
Pickering introduces a temporal dimension to the interaction of scientist and material, 
whereby, in a ‘dialectic of resistance and accommodation’ (Pickering, 1995: 22), 
engineers produce new tools. Here humans and non-humans act together, in a process 
characterised by periods of action and passivity taken in turn:  
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As active intentional beings, scientists tentatively construct some new 
machine. They then adopt a passive role, monitoring the performance of 
the machine to see whatever capture of material agency it might effect. 
Symmetrically, this period of human passivity is the period in which 
material agency actively manifests itself. Does the machine perform as 
intended? Has the intended capture of agency been effected? Typically the 
answer is no, in which case the response is another reversal of roles: 
human agency is once more active in a revision of modelling vectors, 
followed by another bout of human passivity and material performance, 
and so on. (Pickering, 1995:21-22)  
In this way, the scientist and the machine interact, ‘dancing’ together, each leading in 
turn, each revising the other, by which they become attuned.  
This insight sheds light on how risk was engaged within the context of the 
laboratory creating the final prototype of the handheld border device. If part of the 
operation of risk lies in the production and circulation of seemingly concrete scientific 
facts (the calculation of a probability, the detection of something dangerous) then by 
combining the exchanges between the laboratory and the wider world and their multiple 
dances, we can begin to explore how ostensibly stable ‘facts’ become established. 
The production of the device we observed could be described as a process of 
becoming objective: a risk calculus in the form of a handheld device that appeared to 
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satisfy the demands of a degree of certainty on tracing CBRNE and cocaine or tobacco. 
Such products of science and engineering are characterised by Latour (1987) as 
‘immutable mobiles’, (machines, representations, readings, data, etc.) that can travel 
freely and be (relatively) unchanged by that movement. They are the assumed 
universals of scientific knowledge or technological materiality, but in fact are always 
the product of multiple ‘dances’ such as those between scientists, policing actors, and 
matter and machines in the handheld device which combined different risk logics and 
practices to produce a stable representation of risk to inform border decisions and thus 
to stage sovereignty and certainty at the EU border.  
 
Methods: unpacking risks in border security technology development 
Our research is based on a larger social science study of an EU-funded FP7 
project. The FP7 project involved nine partners, a mixture of academics, including 
biologists, physicists, chemical and software and hardware systems engineers, as well as 
SMEs, and border guards (police and customs organisations). Scientists came from five 
EU countries: Ireland, Germany, Portugal, Estonia, and the UK. Our data were collected 
over 20 months (March 2013-October 2014) by an interdisciplinary group of five social 
scientists drawn from criminology, sociology, and international relations scholars, as 
well as two co-investigators from engineering disciplines. Intensive data collection for 
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the observation study began at month six of the FP7 research project and ended just 
after the demonstration of the first working prototype to the funders in month 24.‡  
Our collective multi-sited and multi-disciplinary study (Marcus, 1995; Erickson 
and Stull, 1998; Clerke and Hopwood, 2014; Falzon, 2016), included 50 in-depth 
interviews with all major participants in the project, as well as government officials and 
other technology companies; observation of all major project meetings, interactions 
with European funders, trade fairs such as Counter Terrorism Expo, and the daily work 
of scientists and engineers in their laboratories across Europe. We also observed and 
interviewed some customs and border guards at work at borders. We organised 
discussions in workshops with wider stakeholders from government and industry to 
expand and validate our findings.  
Quotations from interviews were taken from audio recordings and transcriptions; 
those from meetings and observations were taken with more traditional paper and pencil 
during or immediately after the event by scholars on the team; they were shared and in 
most cases discussed collectively (Erickson and Stull, 1998; Clerke and Hopwood, 
																																								 																				
‡ Although we followed only this project in depth, potentially limiting the generalisability of our findings, 
we sought to validate our findings through wider discussions and interviews with industry, government 
officials responsible for security technology development, and other projects funded under the same call. 
Notably, many other projects had more limited end-user engagement (observation and private 
conversations). Approximately 70% of FP7 security technology projects incorporate end-user roles, but 
they are often confined to advisory panels (CSES, 2011). In our engagements with end-users, industry, 
and others, we found that gaining access to end-users is challenging for smaller companies and research 
organisations. Our observations of the project lasted until the first prototype. However, through 
interviews and some prior engagement with the project, we were able to gain a sense of the project at the 
proposal stage; we continued our engagement in some key events after the end of our observations.  
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2014). To maintain anonymity, our references omit information on the professional 
tasks of our informants, providing only the date of data collection. We gained access to 
the above-mentioned scientific project through previous professional connections with 
lead scientists. In the process, we were surprised by the researchers’ openness at sharing 
what they were doing. However, we were required not to divulge the data we were 
collecting until the end of the project.  
 
Deciding what to detect: the assemblage of the catastrophic, the mundane, crime 
and competitive logics  
Since 2001, combating CBRNE smuggling and terrorism has been integral to 
EU security practices. Strong emphasis is placed on portable detection technologies for 
border control, alongside and reinforcing risk profiling and intelligence (European 
Commission, 2007; 2014).§ In 2010 the EU called for the production of handheld 
technological devices able to detect various possible threats:  
[The] integration of different technologies for the detection of illegal substances 
and hidden persons, border control [is] closely linked to custom control of goods 
(this category comprises inter alia weapons, drugs, CBRNE, legal goods subject 
																																								 																				
§	CBRNE detection has a strong economic dimension, with technologies linked to the development of ‘a 
European Market for security products and systems’ (Case Study of CBRN, 2011). The fear of CBRNE 
terrorism is driving growth in the global market for detection equipment, predicted to increase from 
US$2.2billion in 2015 to US$9.8billion in 2022 (RNR Market Research, 2016). This would exceed the 
global market for policing equipment (US$7.08billion in 2016) (Visiongain, 2016).	
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to duty, good subject to import or export restriction and those that fail to meet 
health and safety standards). (European Commission, 2010: 24)  
Catastrophic terrorism, public health, duty revenues and organised criminality were 
loosely linked in the initial call, demonstrating how different fields of security overlap 
(Crawford and Hutchinson, 2016). Most of the projects funded under this call, however, 
prioritised CBRNE.  
While the European Commission emphasises research capacity, it always seeks 
to meet the challenges and needs of public service (observation, 22/5/2014).** Thus, the 
EU requires research teams to involve end users (in this case, border guards and 
policing agents) from the beginning to ensure effectiveness (Observation 22/5/2014; 
Interview A 14/3/2015). In the project we studied, end users were integrated from the 
start of the project and – to varying degrees – participated in technical meetings, 
provided testing and demonstration opportunities, took scientists to borders to see daily 
practices, and provided input on detection thresholds, user interfaces and so forth.  
The specific end-users involved in the project we observed, and others called in 
to comment on it, played a prominent role in determining the utility of the technological 
device.  As it happened, end-users were generally more concerned with the detection of 
illegal and more mundane substances in their daily and local contexts, than with the 
																																								 																				
** EU representatives consistently emphasized the importance of having a final working device, so the 
funding could be seen as successful.  
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detection of highly dangerous materials specified by the EU (linked to terrorism or 
rogue states).†† Their understanding of this aspect of risk was strongly linked to their 
fundamentally practical and local experience in their specific professions/roles and geo-
political locations. Indeed, in general, border guards were perplexed by the prominence 
of CBRNE in EU concerns. While acknowledging that CBRNE should be monitored, 
they argued that such issues were  uncommon and thus the end-users felt that the EU 
call was not in tune with their operational needs. They variously commented: ‘Tobacco 
and cigarettes would be extremely successful [and] trade in illicit medicines is huge’; ‘I 
do not have explosive letters, I do not have it, why be concerned about it?’(Observation, 
9/5/2013); ‘The greater chance of the device being used is in cocaine, so it would be 
more successful…and you can have results every day...’ (Interview A 16/7/2014). In 
other words, the end-users contested the search for the ‘exceptional and the 
catastrophic’ and went back to their local knowledge of what was most likely to impact 
them. In some contexts, it was cocaine, and in others it was tobacco and similar items. 
When the scientists ‘tuned in’ to them (inviting them to the ‘dance’), these specific local 
priorities were incorporated into the device as if they were the main threats, even if they 
																																								 																				
†† In this project many end-users were limited their participation to providing operating scenarios. This 
meant that those that were more closely involved had more influence, as did some special-end users and 
border guards brought to the table by the EU to ensure maximum return on its new device. Indeed, the EU 
organised a number of events in which various projects were presented to different end-users and guards 
from all over Europe. At a meeting we attended, border guards came from countries at the edge of the 
EU: Poland, Slovenia, or even the UK.  
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might not apply in other contexts and even if they did not perfectly match the original 
EU concerns.  
 The scientists were less concerned about the substances to detect. They turned to 
the end-users because they saw their particular practice-based knowledge as more likely 
to guarantee the success (i.e. utility/profitability) of their research (Interview A, 
28/10/2013). One asked, ‘What’s the point if you’re detecting things that no one really 
cares about?’ As he said, the end-users put ‘expert knowledge on the table right away” 
(ibidem). Even though the EU had made the call for research, and funded the project, 
the EU was not perceived as the expert in determining the devices needed at the border. 
This raises questions about the distinction between professional/expert knowledge and 
ways of ‘knowing otherwise’ (Walklate and Mythen, 2011; Baillergeau and Duyvendak, 
2016). Professional risk assessment tools often leave out forms of knowledge -the 
“knowing otherwise’ - based on the intuition and everyday experience of some less 
powerful subjects (Walklate and Mythen, 2011). In our study, instead, it appears that 
even if the EU policy seemed to be privileging low probability and high consequences 
risks, it also allowed for some professional end users to incorporate their everyday and 
contextual understanding of what constituted risk- their ‘knowing otherwise’- as a way 
of guaranteeing the greatest certainty and security at the border. In this case, therefore, 
expert knowledge was the knowledge coming from specific everyday experience and 
understanding of context.  
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 Overall, the determination of what risky substances were worthy of detection at 
borders was not derived from formal threat assessments but from the interaction of 
various subjects’ knowledge and understanding of everyday ‘risk’ at the border. 
Scientists negotiated within the parameters of the funding call but attributed greater 
relevance to those able to speak in everyday practical terms about their experience of 
risky substances at borders.  
This was a heterogeneous collection of practitioners, drawn from different 
countries and types of institutions. Although they could all be broadly categorized as 
policing agents, they had quite different focuses and understood the technology under 
construction as facilitating different activities. Some saw it as facilitating routine border 
checks; others conceived it as a tool to facilitate investigative work in a larger area. 
When their views of risk were taken seriously, the device incorporated heterogeneous 
policing aims. Some end users privileged the search for cocaine and others for tobacco- 
as they believed these to be more interesting from their knowledge of border policing, 
while scientists kept some interest in the detection of radiation. Ultimately, the device 
showed neither a predominant form of risk, nor a rationalised hierarchy of risks. Rather, 
the aims of the technology shifted to incorporate local and national risks, criminal and 
taxation enforcement priorities. By the end of the project, the multiple sensors on the 
device could detect cocaine, tobacco, explosives and radiation and could be tuned to 
other substances in future. The mundane and the catastrophic were assembled together 
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within the technology to meet the needs of quite different policing agents and of 
different scientific possibilities.  
 
Risk inscribed in the technology: attuning worlds in the lab 
While the project articulated ‘risk’ in terms of substances of concern, there was 
also a common perception – shared by scientists from all fields and acknowledged by 
end-users - that technology itself is ‘risky’. There was a general understanding that the 
biggest challenge of the handheld device was ‘getting it to work in the field’.  Engaging 
this risk animated much of the scientific collaboration – as scientists frequently invoked 
wider conversations with border guards who spoke of ‘storerooms full of equipment’ 
(multiple observations and interviews) that worked in the laboratory but not in the field. 
Addressing this particular ‘risk’ required attuning scientific and engineering practice to 
the messy material world of bordering. Border guards said that in the absence of 
evidence showing its utility, the technology might not even be considered, as generally 
speaking, manufacturers’ claims and stated capabilities ‘are not considered reliable’ 
(Interview A, 18/11/2013). ‘Having it tested by a user group’ is important (Observation 
3/3/2014). Their worries included that it might not be successful at a certain distance or 
speed, or it could result in false negatives (making the device useless) or false positives 
(making people lose confidence in results) (Observation, 18/11/2013). The literature 
points to the general reluctance of policing agents to adopt new technological devices 
forthcoming	in	Criminology	and	Criminal	Justice.	Draft	version	before	copy	editing.		
[Type	text]	 [Type	text]	 [Type	text] 
21	
(Manning, 2008); there is greater trust in experience, especially direct personal 
experience, than in the market. Indeed, those we talked to said many existing devices 
were not being used as they were too time consuming and yielded too few results for the 
time involved (Observation, 18/11/13). They tended to use them only if suspicion was 
multiple and well-founded. Thus the risk of failure was translated into the risk that the 
device was not attuned to fitting in with the multiple ways border guards tend to sense 
risk at borders. Would it be fast enough to fit with the routines of guards and the flow of 
traffic? Would the battery last long enough? Etc. 
In bordering practice, the human ability to suspect a package or a person seems 
to be trusted more than technology (Observation 18/11/2013; multiple private 
conversations; see also Bigo, 2014). When asked about their procedure to determine 
risk, border guards at ports, in postal depots, or at airport arrivals of both cargo and 
people, strongly argued that ‘everything that sticks out’ (Observation and interviews 
18/11/2013) is risky. ‘People who are nervous’ or ‘big companies but weird ways of 
delivery’ may trigger concern (ibidem). The method of delivery and collection is seen 
as something to pay attention to, especially ‘what is not collected in person’. Risky 
parcels are ‘sensed’ though common sense and experiential knowledge of what is 
unusual: these include parcels not directly related to a phone line or an address, not paid 
for, not having gone through the security checks etc. (Observations and private 
conversations 18/11/2013). Risk is also more prosaically identified with specific ports 
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or countries of origin: Rotterdam, Dublin, Latin America and Spain are seen as risky 
(ibidem). This again suggests the use of situated knowledge and of ‘knowing otherwise’ 
in the detection of risk.  
To the border guards, technology simply cannot identify some crucial 
differences that can be ‘sensed’. Risk is not a single dimension that can be spotted by a 
handheld device: it is omnipresent, loose, and emergent from a combination of target 
substances, detection devices, routines, personal experience, and, importantly, the 
conditions of a particular operating context. Here, ways of knowing risk are entangled 
with material conditions that helped translate experiences into engineering tasks. For 
example, by the middle of the project, it was clear that the device had to operate at 
temperatures between -40 and +50 Celsius to accommodate countries at the extreme 
latitudes of Europe. This requirement then anchored numerous other practical questions 
that border guards raised in the context of group meetings when the development in the 
laboratories and future moves were presented to them. Could gloves be used with the 
user-interface? Was the display big enough? Would the tool really be portable? Was the 
detection time sufficient for each location of control? A postal sorting office presents a 
different challenge from a busy airport, for example, and a small border space is 
qualitatively different from a large border space.  
These real-life scenarios and their risks provided by the end users helped the 
scientists make design decisions. They ‘tuned’ the technology to the various imagined 
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environmental and contextual conditions at the border, as a way of scaling down the 
risks (linked to the development and deployment) inherent to the production of 
technology. This suggests that technology is not inherently universal; it has to be made 
so by making it work in all imagined fields. In a context of great uncertainty (not just 
uncertainty and risk at the border, but risk within the lab), the scientists turned to the 
experiences of policing agents to refine the parameters of this. As other researchers 
note, the calculative probabilistic narrative of risk is only followed when it agrees with 
practitioners’ understanding in cases of great uncertainties (Baillergeau and Duyvendak, 
2016; Mythen and Walklate, 2011). In this case, the experts were valuing risks on the 
basis of their ‘knowing otherwise’ the way in which policing happens at the border, in 
specific contexts and within specific circumstances.  
Although risk is often conceived as a particular means of anticipating and acting 
upon the future through scientific means, we found that the practice of developing those 
scientific means included a combination of less probabilistic forms of anticipation and 
action, of past experience and personal knowledge. The handheld device is the result of 
these varied experiential considerations. The device must be able to work in particular 
contexts, including the interaction between the policing agent and the material context 
of the work. Developing the technology meant accepting, not eliminating, the 
experiential – even instinctive – practical sense of the border guards that was perceived 
to be the professional knowledge needed to make the device work.  
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Dancing with risk in the lab: technical savoir, gut feelings and scenario 
imagination.   
Although the scientists working on the project referred to risk and ‘de-risking,’ 
they admitted that their emphasis on risk came from pressure from the EU.  It was 
mostly a way to ‘talk back’ in the language of the call, part of the strategy to please the 
Commission. One scientist said, ‘the risk analysis part was crucial to the negotiation 
stage, it was something highlighted by the reviewer’ (Interview 29/10/2013; European 
Commission, 2010).  Another commented: ‘the idea of risk analysis was something that 
was relatively foreign, believe it or not, to the scientists in the proposal in the early 
days’ (Interview 29/10/2013). Some had experience of risk analysis from their 
background in industry: ‘The risk input was mostly coming from one scientist’s 
experience in industry, tweaked with academic experience and added in the salesman’s 
skills of somebody else’ (Interview 29/10/2013). But even if scientists strategically 
adopted the language of risk to respond to the EU, this had little impact on their 
practice. They accepted and welcomed ‘risk’ when they understood it as the uncertainty 
engrained in the process of research, rather than something to be avoided. This form of 
risk, too, was mitigated using professional and experiential knowledge, and while 
dancing with multiple forms of risks, they always maintained other options.  
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Scientists were puzzled by our questions on the risks they encountered in their 
work. We had assumed that risk should be reduced, but they found it useful. They all 
stressed that risk is part of the scientific process and in ways not easily calculable in 
advance. One said: ‘If you are developing any technology from a concept level the risk 
is always high even if you think that you have all the problems solved, it does not work 
like that. There are always problems that come up that you don’t foresee especially if 
it’s new’ (Interview B, 8/11/2013).  
To scientists, risk analysis was not probabilistic but qualitative, linked to a 
general sense of possibility of something failing or something not quite working the 
way it should. The notion of risk was a means of communicating this qualitative sense 
of uncertainty throughout the development of technology. This was evident in how they 
discussed ways to avoid risk. To some scientists, the most reasonable strategy was to 
consider an alternative: ‘A de-risk strategy: it’s building the software knowing it’s 
going to have to all change. That’s how I address it’ (Interview B 24/10/2013). As the 
project developed, their idea of risk avoidance or analysis was mostly related to having 
a ‘plan B’: ‘It’s about your best effort to try and ensure that when things go wrong you 
have another strategy to try’ (Interview A 29/10/2013).  Again, the calculation of risk 
was not based on probabilistic calculus but on imagining possible alternatives. At times, 
this meant working on two possible methods simultaneously in case one failed. At other 
times, commercially available components were researched as a back-up plan. One 
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scientist said: ‘In the very beginning of the project when it was not clear at all whether 
this system will work or not, our particular module will work or not, we were looking 
for different systems by other manufacturers that have similar sizes, for example, 
similar power consumption, stuff like that, so that just for the worst case we would have 
a backup’ (Interview A, 9/4/2014).  
One of the most used strategies was to refer to the market. They looked at what 
was available on the market to explore alternatives or to select the option they thought 
was the most likely to be effective. For instance, the processing platform chosen 
initially had to be changed to accommodate the requirements of other new components 
as detection methods evolved (Interview A, 28/5/2014; Observation 3/3/2014). In 
discussions of the available literature, scientists referred to the market as the most valid 
source of knowledge: what others have done, what product is available or what exists, 
they said, limits some of the uncertainties.  
Just as the guards at border sites made use of an implicit and unquantifiable 
sense of something beyond the normal, so too scientists worked on what they described 
as ‘gut instinct’ (Interview A, 28/5/2014). One said: ‘we have some sort of gut feeling 
of what we need to understand, what we need to do…It’s very difficult to convey this 
knowledge. So they do it based on experience and it’s, it’s like black magic’ (Interview 
A, 28/5/2014). This ‘gut feeling/black magic’ suggests a mixture of personal technical 
knowledge, experience and imagination. One scientist described this relationship 
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between knowledge and experience as the following: ‘the only way I’m assessing or 
we’re assessing risk is, one of experience. We’ve more experience with this technology 
so we know what the risks are, so we can assess them, okay?  If you can’t assess them 
properly then I put them in medium-high risk’ (Interview D 8/11/13).  
Risks were often resolved by scientists individually by making ‘an educated 
guess’ (Interview B, 24/10/2013). We understood this to mean the capacity to imagine 
the future either because they had tried it before or because it was common knowledge 
in their field. In other words, it was situated knowledge based on imaginations of what 
could possibly happen. This was not just about prior knowledge of facts and figures in 
specific scenario, however. It also included techniques and experiences of working 
through unexpected scenarios to make something work. Scientists stressed that risk and 
failure belong to the process itself, but they tended to see it as an essential component of 
creativity and the production of knowledge. 
 As Luhmann suggests (1993), risk is inherent to the scientific and commercial 
opportunities of technology development. In such cases, risk is looked upon with 
enthusiasm, especially at the initial stages of development. In the device we observed, 
variations in temperature or power or in the tilting/stability of the tool represented 
‘challenges’ that could potentially be productive. One scientist said:  
I guess the area of science that is the most challenging, and therefore offers 
potentially the biggest rewards, is biological detection, and that was not maybe 
	[Type	text]	 [Type	text]	 [Type	text]	
28	
as well defined as we thought it was at the start of the project, because the 
science revealed some interesting problems along the way. (Interview A 
29/10/13)  
Thus, in the first instance, risk was welcomed as inherent and potentially valuable. 
Then, when the risk of failure pushed back, they passed agency to the border guards, 
underlining previous discussion of the need to engage with the specific border contexts 
in which the device was to operate.  
As noted above, the border guard end-users and their knowledge of everyday 
practices in different contexts was crucial. They suggested scenarios in which to 
imagine the technology at play, and their requirements limited the spaces of uncertainty. 
For this reason, their knowledge was often enrolled in the process of development: how 
is the device meant to work, in what context? What will guards do or what can they do, 
for how long, to what level of determination, etc.? Information was accepted without 
contestation as a way of acting on the uncertainties (and risks) of the process of 
experimentation. Scientists were happy to be constrained by these scenarios, as they 
helped them find solutions and gave them a greater sense that what they were doing was 
less likely to fail. When information was not directly provided, scientists extrapolated 
from end-users’ stories of their experiences and their needs and the context in which 
they operated.  
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 Overall, scientists demonstrated that the totalizing logic of risk assumed at 
theoretical and policy level has not completely trumped more positive views of 
uncertainty and that in spite of the theoretical discourse on risk imperialism (Walklate 
and Mythen, 2011: 108) there are a number of different narratives and practices of risk 
management and assessment. Scientists talked of risk and uncertainty interchangeably. 
This was encountered in multiple ways – positive and negative. They negotiated risk 
and uncertainty through their personal specialized knowledge and the end-users’ 
professional and experiential knowledge. They saw risk as an intricate part of the 
scientific development and they welcomed it for the potential rewards that overcoming 
it may bring. Risk became manageable in the production of a device intended to 
produce certainty at the border when different sets of experiential and professional 
knowledge joined together in the ‘dance’.  
 
Dancing with multiple risks: the return of experiential and professional knowledge  
As, policing is becoming increasingly fragmented and pluralised, we looked at 
the roles of both the research groups and their partners (private and public) in the 
creation of a technological device to manage transnational policing issues through the 
detection of dangerous substances. Multiple actors determined the technology, with a 
strong role played by subjects positioned within the field of policing. This makes 
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evident how situated experiential and contextual knowledge of specific fields 
contributed to shaping the device.  
Further, power circulates and is activated by different subjects in the process of 
scientific development and in the determination of security at the border, following 
different rationalities and narratives of risks, of which those determined by states and 
supranational institutions are only part of the process and not necessarily the most 
significant ones. Rather, power is increasingly shared, with myriad actors setting up 
complex and hybrid arrangements of practices and mentalities. In the case of the 
handheld device, different risk logics were assembled together in the final security 
technology. The EU security concerns with catastrophic risk of CBRNE may have 
triggered the project and were never entirely forgotten, but the notions of risk actually 
driving the development of the device were quite different, incorporating the more 
mundane preoccupations of some policing agents, and the risks of technological 
development the scientists felt were more pressing. We do not see this as an example of 
‘mission creep’, however, but as the epitome of a new modality whereby some actors 
enrolled in the provision of security through technology may not necessarily be visible 
to political scrutiny.  
Our engagement with STS and the concepts of tuning and dancing allows us to 
register the ways in which different understandings of risk, danger, and security are 
assembled in one device. Even if a particular technology promises instantaneous 
forthcoming	in	Criminology	and	Criminal	Justice.	Draft	version	before	copy	editing.		
[Type	text]	 [Type	text]	 [Type	text] 
31	
certainty in the face of unknown risks at the border, in the case of the handheld device, 
the final determination on what to detect or how to devise the technology was not a 
simple technical arrangement in relation to the risk at the border, but rather the product 
of the assemblage of multiple forms and discourses of risk. Rather than operating 
through a bounded and actuarial knowledge of risk, the various actors involved danced 
with multiple risks, modes of risk assessment and risk management, among which the 
experiential and professional knowledge of situated past experiences and scenario 
creation were predominant. Even in the laboratories, there was no actuarial, 
probabilistic grounding for risk based decisions; only an assemblage of experiential, 
informal, affective and deeply social risk practices as scientists engaged with the 
material world of substances and matter. Likewise, if border guards, customs officials, 
and police act on the basis of information from the machine, they act on the basis not 
only of discovered fact but also on the contingent, lively, and unstable engagement of 
multiple forms of risk.	
The official EU discourse of CBRNE risk was set against the working 
knowledge of risk at borders as selected by specific localised policing agents, and this 
combined with the scientific conception of risk and of development of technology in the 
lab.  All these different discourses of risk were then combined in the security 
technology. Technological devices are the product of multiple forms of risk knowledge 
and management as they combine, sometimes conflict, and are translated into each other 
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to connect the different worlds of policing agents, and the material contexts of borders 
and laboratories. In technological development, risk assessment involves a combination 
of technical and experiential knowledge since it emerges through the dance of devices, 
materials, and end users advice. So that what appears as a technical object is not simply 
the product of objective view of possibilities and probabilities but shot through with 
political assumptions, discretions, and uncertainties of the messy material world.  
In this project, on the one hand, the device was intended to secure borders from 
CBRNE, on the other hand to aid investigative policing and trace criminal behaviour, 
and further, it was expected to detect illegal substances. Different forms of risk, their 
combinations and transformations, had an impact on the final device. For instance, in 
the move to merge the catastrophic and the mundane in the selection of target 
substances, the EU deferred to this redirection towards the mundane and accepted the 
relevance of practitioners’ contextual experience and professional knowledge to 
determine risks at the border. We found that scientists similarly deferred to border 
professionals and policing agents, asking for their understanding of risks, as a way of 
making the technology more effective and heightening its possible competitive value 
and commercialization. The policing agents, in turn, espoused an understanding of 
security and risk related to their knowledge of everyday practices and challenges in 
specific contexts; their understanding was neither the actuarial calculation of risk nor 
solely the imagination of low probability, high consequence events, arguably 
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evidencing the elision between expert knowledge and everyday experience. Scientists in 
the laboratories connected with this through their own combinations of experiential and 
scientific knowledge – using that to channel the challenges. Certainly they appealed to 
facts and figures to communicate this back to the end-users and funders, but this was 
often a translation and communication of experiential knowledge.  
Thus, we continually observed the relevance of the everyday experience in the 
determination of risk in all spheres and at all levels of risk. We neither condemn nor 
celebrate this; rather, we call for its engagement as something inherent in the process of 
technologisation of risk and uncertainty.  
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